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MARRIAGE REGISTRARS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN 






There is a multiplicity of differing ways in which religious beliefs and practices are 
‘protected’ from state interference, but in essence this diversity of approach resolves into 
three main approaches: (i) a freedom of religion approach in which the practice of religion 
is protected; (ii) a protection from religious coercion and undue religious entanglement 
with the state; and (iii) an anti-discrimination approach in which religious discrimination 
is prohibited. Using the terminology of the United States Constitution, let’s call these the 
free exercise, establishment, and equal protection approaches. Similar approaches, using 
different terminology, can be found in most modern systems committed to human rights. 
 
The assumption is often made that issues of religious conscience arise primarily in 
the context of the first of these approaches: an individual with a conscientious belief argues 
that the guarantee that we are free to practice our religion means that anti-discrimination 
law prohibiting gender, or race, or sexual orientation discrimination that requires us to 
contravene our conscience should be limited, or overridden, or set aside: the conscientious 
believer should be granted an exemption from the application of anti-discrimination law. 
This framing of the issue means that the conflict is a relatively straightforward one between 
freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination. And there have, indeed, been several 
high profile cases that have been formulated in just this way, and the conflicts between 
equality and freedom of religion that are generated are complex and multifaceted. In some 
jurisdictions, this may, indeed, be the principal way in which the issues will be framed. 
 
																																																								
 FBA; Professor of Human Rights and Equality Law, Queen’s University Belfast; William W Cook 
Global Professor of Law, Michigan Law School. An earlier version was presented at the symposium: (How) 
Should the European Court of Human Rights Resolve Conflicts Between Human Rights?, Human Rights 
Centre, Ghent University, 16 October 2014, and at the conference: The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the 
Balance between Religion, Identity, and Equality, will Cardozo Law School, 20-21 September 2015. I am 
particularly grateful to Judge Paul Lemmens of the European Court of Human Rights for commenting on an 
earlier version of the paper at the symposium, and to Robert Post for commenting on a more recent  version 
of the paper at the conference. Full disclosure: I was Junior Counsel representing Ms Ladele in the European 
Court of Human Rights, and subsequently provided legal advice to the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of 
England and Wales on the legal implications of the same-sex marriage legislation during the Parliamentary 
consideration of the Bill.  
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But, at least in the European context, to conceive the problem of religious 
conscience only in this way is misleading, and evades an even more difficult issue. 
Recently, much more attention has been given to the relationship between conscience and 
discrimination in a way that generates tensions within the concepts of equality and 
discrimination themselves. This is because, increasingly, the claim to protection by the 
conscientious believer is formulated in anti-discrimination terms rather than (or sometimes 
in addition to) freedom of religion terms: the claim is that by requiring me to conform to 
an anti-discrimination requirement that prohibits racial or gender or sexual orientation, you 
discriminate against me on religious grounds. In this paper, I shall be focusing, therefore, 
on conflicts within equality that are generated by claims to the protection of religious 
conscience formulated as religious discrimination claims. 
 
The example I want to take to illustrate this approach, and its problems in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) context, is the case of Ladele v United 
Kingdom, decided in January 2015 by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).1 
Lillian Ladele was a marriage registrar, with years of good service, employed by a local 
public authority (the London Borough of Islington). The law in the United Kingdom 
changed whilst she was in post to permit civil partnerships between same-sex couples. Ms 
Ladele had a sincere conscientious objection to performing civil partnership ceremonies, 
arising from her Christian faith. In spite of her protests, Ms Ladele was designated to 
register and perform civil partnership ceremonies by the local authority, contrary to her 
religion and conscience. She refused, was disciplined, and forced to resign. She claimed 
religious discrimination in the national courts, won at first instance, lost at the domestic 
appellate level, and then took her case to the ECtHR, where she also lost. 
 
In this chapter, I hope to achieve four aims.  First, in Part II, I set out and analyse 
the facts and reasoning of the ECtHR in Ladele, and suggest that in several respects the 
Court’s approach is problematic. Second, in Part III, I suggest that the problem that the 
Ladele case presents, and the approach that the Court takes in addressing this problem, 
raises broader questions, going beyond the acceptability of arguments based on conscience. 
My argument will be that in carrying out their adjudicatory task in religious discrimination 
litigation, such as Ladele, there is a fundamental problem that the courts are faced with on 
a recurring basis. As a shorthand way of describing it, I’ll call it the ‘teleological’ problem. 
By the teleological problem, I mean the problem that the courts face of deciding what 
human rights protections relating specifically to discrimination are for, what their aim or 
telos is. I suggest that this difficulty arises both for those provisions dealing with religious 
discrimination, as well as for those provisions dealing with discrimination on other 
grounds. There is essentially no clear answer to the question as to what they aim to achieve, 
																																																								
1 Ladele v United Kingdom was one of four cases heard together by the ECtHR, sub nom Eweida 
and others v United Kingdom (2015) 57 EHRR 8. 
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and when they come into conflict, the courts are thrown into confusion. The result (in 
Ladele) is that the Court considers the teleology of religious anti-discrimination to be 
largely co-terminous with freedom of religion. The Court, in other words, defaults to an 
understanding of religious discrimination claims as masked freedom of religion claims. 
The effect is significantly to blunt the radical potential of religious discrimination claims 
and incorporate elements into the legal analysis of such claims that are sui generis in the 
anti-discrimination context. 
 
Third, in Part IV, I offer some preliminary and provisional thoughts as to how to 
address this problem at the judicial level in the context of anti-discrimination law. In 
particular, I argue that the human rights system should be aiming to encourage a genuine 
dialogue between conscientious believers and the wider public, and that there are three 
particularly important doctrinal moves that courts’ could usefully make to encourage and 
sustain such a dialogue: adopting the concept of pluralism as the central telos of religious 
anti-discrimination law; adopting the idea of secularity rather than secularism as the 
appropriate way of conceiving the public space; and adopting a radical understanding of 
religious accommodation. In this way, I suggest, our commitment to religious pluralism 
engendered through dialogue can better be achieved.  
 
Finally, in Part V, I briefly test what difference adopting the recommended 
approach would have made in the Ladele situation. 
 




The local authority that employed Ms Ladele was under no legal obligation to 
designate her as a civil partnership registrar. Nor was there any practical need for her to be 
designated in order for the local authority to provide the service of registering civil 
partnerships to gay couples. Prior to designating her, the local authority was aware of Ms 
Ladele’s religious conscientious objection but did not consult her on its decision to 
designate her.  Having been designated, when she objected to being compelled to form 
civil partnerships and repeated her religiously-based conscientious objection, she was 
disciplined for gross misconduct, and ultimately resigned as a result of the treatment she 
received. The local authority gave no weight to her religious beliefs. Having lost at the 
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domestic level, Ms Ladele brought a claim for religious discrimination in the ECtHR, 
alleging a breach of Article 14,2 taken together with Article 9.3 
 
Lillian Ladele’s case raises significant questions about the correct interpretation of 
the ECHR in cases involving religious belief and practice in the workplace and in public 
life. Should such a religious conscientious objection be accommodated in circumstances 
where accommodating it would have no adverse effects on the conduct of the employer’s 
business or on the rights of any individual? Does discrimination on grounds of religious 
belief requiring particularly weighty reasons for it to be justified under Article 14, read 
with Article 9 of the Convention (similar to the idea of a suspect classification under the 
US Fourteenth Amendment),? Should the right to equal treatment on grounds of religious 
belief be afforded less weight than the right to equal treatment on grounds of sexual 
orientation? What margin of appreciation should be afforded to states in cases of religious 
discrimination? 
 
Chamber decision in Ladele  
 
The Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) gave the 
Ladele case priority status and joined it with three other cases (Eweida, Macfarlane and 
Chaplin), all from the United Kingdom. Eweida and Chaplin alleged a breach of Article 9 
(freedom of religion) on the basis that the applicants had not been allowed to wear religious 
symbols. Macfarlane alleged a breach of Article 9 on the basis that he had been dismissed 
for failure to commit to offering sexual counseling services to same-sex couples. The cases 
were joined as ‘test cases’ to allow the Fourth Section to identify and apply the relevant 
principles across an area of jurisprudence; each applicant was separately represented. On 
the 15th January 2013, the Fourth Section of the Court held by five votes to two that there 
had been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 in respect of Ms 
Ladele.4 Mr Macfarlane and Ms Chaplin also lost. Ms Eweida’s case was alone in being 
upheld, although its practical significance was limited, since British Airways had already 
conceded the point. 
 
																																																								
2 Article 14 ECHR provides: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this European 
Convention on Human Rights shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.’ 
3 Article 9 ECHR provides: ‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
4 Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom (in the application of Ms. Ladele) (2015) 57 EHRR 8. 
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Alone among the four cases, Ms Ladele’s case was based on Article 14 read with 
Article 9, not Article 9 by itself. In other words, her case was formulated as an anti-
discrimination argument, rather than a freedom of religion argument. Three major issues 
were presented to the Court in Ladele. Of these three, the Court agreed with Ms Ladele’s 
argument in two and disagreed in the third. I shall briefly mention the two issues in which 
Ms Ladele succeeded, before turning to the third, in which she was unsuccessful.  
 
To reach the conclusion that Ms Ladele’s claim should be upheld, the Court 
nevertheless had to decide that Ms Ladele’s claim fell “within the ambit” of Article 9. 
Unless it was within the ambit of Article 9, Article 14 would not be engaged because 
Article 14 is not a “stand-alone” anti-discrimination provision, but one that is parasitic on 
other substantive protections in the ECHR. The Government argued that for a claim to be 
within the ambit of Article 9, there had to be a breach of Article 9. The Court, however, 
held that “the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of one or more of [the 
other substantive provisions].”5 And then, later: “it is clear that the applicant’s objection to 
participating in the creation of same-sex civil partnerships was directly motivated by her 
religious beliefs. The events in question fell within the ambit of Article 9.”6 This finding 
has important implications for future litigation under Article 14 religious discrimination 
claims. The applicant does not have to show that she was engaged in a “manifestation of 
religion” in the narrow sense of being involved in some religious ritual, in order for her 
claim to be “within the ambit” of Article 9. Nor does the applicant have to show an 
“interference” with the manifestation of religion, in order for Article 14 to be engaged. 
Future applicants will only need to show that their actions were, in the Court’s words, 
“directly motivated by religious beliefs.” 
 
The second major issue on which Ms Ladele persuaded the Court was that she had 
been treated in such a way as to establish a prima facie claim of religious discrimination, 
which the Government needed to justify. For a claim of discrimination under Article 14 to 
succeed, an applicant must show that he or she was either (a) treated differently from other 
persons in analogous, or relevantly similar situations, or (b) treated similarly to persons in 
relevantly different situations. Ms Ladele’s claim arose under (b), i.e. she argued that she 
was treated similarly to other persons in relevantly different situations. In failing to treat 
Ms Ladele differently from those staff who did not have a conscientious objection to 
registering civil partnerships, she argued that the local authority failed “to treat differently 
persons whose situations are significantly different”, as the Court put it in Thlimmenos v 
Greece,7 which has often been seen as having introduced the idea of “indirect” 
discrimination (or the “effects” test, to use American terminology) into ECHR 
																																																								
5 at para 85. 
6 Eweida, para 103. 
7 Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 15. 
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jurisprudence. The Court agreed that she had correctly identified the relevant comparators, 
holding that the “relevant comparator in this case is a registrar with no religious objection 
to same sex unions.”  The Court further agreed that failing to treat her differently from 
those staff meant that the local authority failed “to treat differently persons whose situations 
are significantly different”. The Court agreed with the applicant’s contention “that the local 
authority’s requirement that all registrars … be designated as civil partnership registrars 
had a particularly detrimental impact on her because of her religious beliefs.”8 
 
The Court therefore held that Article 14 was engaged, and that the public 
authority’s treatment of Ms Ladele amounted to a prima facie breach of Article 14’s 
prohibition on indirect discrimination. The third and remaining issue (which led to her case 
being dismissed by the ECtHR) was the critical issue of justification: whether the treatment 
afforded to Ms Ladele pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate to the achievement 
of the aim pursued.9 On this issue, there is extensive jurisprudence in the Article 14 context, 
but the operative part of the Court’s decision in Ladele does not refer to this in any detail. 
The Court’s complete findings on the issue of justification were as follows:  
It remains to be determined whether the means used to pursue this aim were 
proportionate. The Court takes into account that the consequences for the applicant 
were serious: given the strength of her religious conviction, she considered that she 
had no choice but to face disciplinary action rather than be designated a civil 
partnership registrar and, ultimately, she lost her job. Furthermore, it cannot be said 
that, when she entered into her contract of employment, the applicant specifically 
waived her right to manifest her religious belief by objecting to participating in the 
creation of civil partnerships, since this requirement was introduced by her 
employer at a later date. On the other hand, however, the local authority’s policy 
aimed to secure the rights of others which are also protected under the Convention. 
The Court generally allows the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation 
when it comes to striking a balance between competing Convention rights (see, for 
example, Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007-I). In 
all the circumstances, the Court does not consider that the national authorities, that 
is the local authority employer which brought the disciplinary proceedings and also 
the domestic courts which rejected the applicant’s discrimination claim, exceeded 
the margin of appreciation available to them. It cannot, therefore, be said that there 
has been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 in respect of 
[Ms Ladele].10 
It was this approach to the issue of justification that raised the serious questions 
affecting the interpretation of the Convention that Ms Ladele sought to have referred to the 
																																																								
8 Eweida, para 104. 
9 Eweida, para. 104. 
10 Eweida, para 106. 
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Grand Chamber, which ultimately declined to accept the case, thus leaving the Chamber 
decision to stand.  
Approach adopted to “justification” 
We need at this point to parse this critical paragraph on “justification” carefully. 
Two aspects of the approach taken are of considerable importance.  The first is that the 
Court makes clear that the “national authorities” whose action is being scrutinized consists 
not only of the local authority, but also comprises the various courts that adjudicated the 
issue, including in particular the English Court of Appeal. It is necessary, then, to include 
the approach taken by these national courts within the idea of what ‘the state’ did to Ms 
Ladele, and why, in deciding whether the United Kingdom breached the Convention. The 
second important point that emerges from a close reading of the paragraph, is that the 
ECtHR decides that there is no breach of the Convention, “[i]n all the circumstances”.  The 
“circumstances” include the justification for the local authority’s actions advanced by the 
Court of Appeal, which is therefore effectively incorporated by reference into the judgment 
of the ECtHR.  
Critically, therefore, we need to turn to the domestic Court of Appeal’s judgment 
in order to understand the ECtHR’s approach. The Court of Appeal had set out in an 
important paragraph a summary of the reasons why it held that the local authority’s actions 
were justified, and therefore why it would not make a finding of indirect discrimination. 
Ms Ladele was employed in a public job and was working for a public authority; 
she was being required to perform a purely secular task, which was being treated 
as part of her job; Ms Ladele’s refusal to perform that task involved discriminating 
against gay people in the course of that job; she was being asked to perform the 
task because of Islington's Dignity for All policy, whose laudable aim was to avoid, 
or at least minimise, discrimination both among Islington's employees, and as 
between Islington (and its employees) and those in the community they served; 
Ms Ladele’s refusal was causing offence to at least two of her gay colleagues; 
Ms Ladele’s objection was based on her view of marriage, which was not a core 
part of her religion; and Islington's requirement in no way prevented her from 
worshipping as she wished.11 
There are two main issues regarding the Chamber’s approach to justification, read 
together with this passage from the Court of Appeal, that I want to focus on: first, what is 
the standard that the state must meet in order to rebut the prima facie discrimination case -
- the issue of whether a prima facie case of religious discrimination can only be rebutted if 
the state establishes “very weighty reasons” justifying that discrimination, which is the 
standard applied in race, sex, and sexual orientation discrimination; and, second, how and 
																																																								
11 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2010] WLR 955, [2010] ICR 532, [2009] EWCA Civ 
1357, [52]. 
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why the Court applied the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine in this case, and what the 
implications of its approach on this issue are more broadly.  
Religious discrimination and “very weighty reasons” 
As is well known, claims based on race, sex, sexual orientation, and several other 
grounds, are considered by the Court to merit a particularly high degree of protection. In 
such cases, the function of Article 14 is not to be merely ancillary to the other substantive 
rights. It has an important autonomous role in protecting individuals from unfair 
discrimination.  
 “Very weighty reasons” have to be shown by the State before the Court will regard 
prima facie cases of such discrimination as compatible with Article 14. These have 
sometimes been called “suspect categories” by commentators, drawing on United States 
Supreme Court Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. In Ladele, the Court reiterated its 
previous case law regarding sexual orientation, that “differences based on sexual 
orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification.” Where a 
Contracting Party is required to demonstrate “very weighty reasons”, or “particularly 
serious reasons”, it is less likely that the Court will apply an extensive margin of 
appreciation in such cases. Both the issue of margin of appreciation and the weight of the 
burden of justification under Article 14 are intimately related.  
Ms Ladele had argued that in claims of discrimination under Article 14, read with 
Article 9, “religion” is a ground of discrimination that requires “very weighty reasons” at 
the justification stage. She argued that the Court had previously adopted a similar test in 
Hoffmann v Austria,12 and ought to apply this test in her case. Indeed, in Redfearn v UK,13 
decided on the 6th December 2012, a month before Ladele was decided, Judge Bratza, who 
was in the majority in Ladele, specifically listed “religion” as a suspect category meriting 
the “very weighty reasons” test, citing the Hoffmann case.14 Yet there is no reference to 
Hoffmann in the Court’s judgment in Ladele, or to very weighty reasons being required in 
the religious discrimination context.  
As we have seen, in Ladele, the Chamber dealt with the whole question of 
legitimate aim and proportionality very briefly. Two of Ms Ladele’s arguments were 
addressed and accepted by the Court. The Court accepted Ms Ladele’s argument that “the 
consequences for the applicant were serious.” As the Court said: “she lost her job”.15 The 
Court also agreed with Ms Ladele that she could not be regarded as having “waived her 
																																																								
12 (1994) 17 EHRR 293, para 36 
13 Application no. 47335/06, 
14 Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, Hirvelä and Nicolaou, para 4 
15 Eweida, para 106. 
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right to manifest her religious belief …  since [the employer’s requirement that she officiate 
at same sex partnership ceremonies] was introduced by her employer at a later date.”16 
Beyond that, however, it is unclear what, exactly, the Court decided. If the Court 
rejected the argument that religion qualifies as a “suspect” ground, this gives rise to the 
paradoxical situation in which a ground that is explicitly included in the text of Article 14 
(“religion”) is accorded less protection than a ground that is not explicitly included in the 
text (“sexual orientation”) but was introduced by judicial interpretation of “other status”. 
From Ms Ladele’s perspective, there appeared to be no justification for such a hierarchy of 
grounds of discrimination. The argument that religion was not a “suspect” ground would 
also be inconsistent with a more recent judgment by the Court, in Vojnity v Hungary.17 In 
this case, decided on 12 February 2013 (after the judgment  of the Chamber in Ladele but 
before the Grand Chamber rejected he appeal), the Second Section stated explicitly that 
religion should now be considered to be a suspect category, requiring “very weighty 
reasons”.18  
A second possible interpretation of the Court’s decision in the relevant paragraphs 
in Ladele, is that the Court concluded that any government efforts to eradicate 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation will automatically be proportionate simply 
by virtue of that fact. The Court may have accepted the Government’s argument that 
requiring Ms Ladele to validate same-sex civil partnerships was intended to send a message 
on the importance that the local authority attached to the principle of eradicating sexual 
orientation discrimination (irrespective of no individual’s rights having been adversely 
affected), and that this automatically attracted priority over any religious equality interests 
and the adverse effect on Ms Ladele’s rights. If so, as Ms Ladele argued, this was not the 
appropriate approach to adopt to the role of proportionality under Article 14. If 
proportionality means anything, she suggested, it means that it is unacceptable to give one 
factor automatic priority. The Court did not address this issue, perhaps because the Court 
considered that no such automatic priority had been accorded. The Court refers in its 
judgment to “striking a balance between competing rights,”19 implying that both competing 
rights were accorded some weight (an issue I return to in a moment). 
Margin of appreciation 
These two interpretations do not exhaust the possible interpretations.  It is probably 
the case that a third interpretation of the Court’s decision better explains the Court’s 
approach than those we have just considered, although this third interpretation is not set 
out explicitly in the Court’s judgment. This third interpretation is that the Court decided to 
																																																								
16 Eweida, para 106. 
17 Application no. 29617/07. 
18 Vojnity , para 36) 
19 Eweida, para 106. 
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afford a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities in this case and therefore 
considered that it did not need to decide whether discrimination on grounds of religion is 
properly to be treated as a suspect category in this case, or to grapple with the complexities 
of applying proportionality in these circumstances.  
Ms Ladele had argued that according the Government a wide margin of 
appreciation was wrong in law in this case. A margin of appreciation, she stated, must be 
earned by Member States and should apply only when the national authorities have in place 
the appropriate procedures for ensuring compliance with the Convention. The role for a 
margin of appreciation, she suggested, is particularly narrow if religion is a suspect ground 
of discrimination that attracts the test of “very weighty reasons”, as it should. 
In Ms Ladele’s case, she said, neither the public authority that employed her, nor 
the domestic courts that heard her case, had ever conducted any proportionality analysis. 
Her right to equal treatment on grounds of religious belief had been afforded no weight at 
all in the national proceedings. In the circumstances, Ms Ladele argued, the adoption of 
the concept of the margin of appreciation by the Court was wrong in principle. The proper 
role of this doctrine is in the context of assessing the results of a properly executed 
proportionality analysis carried out at the national level. Where the national authorities 
have not assessed the proportionality of discriminatory treatment afforded to a victim, there 
is no good reason to afford them any margin of appreciation. The United Kingdom, by 
failing to ensure that the national authorities (including the domestic courts) carried out an 
appropriate proportionality analysis, had failed to earn the margin of appreciation.  
The Chamber of the Court in Ladele did not address this argument, and accepted 
that the local authority’s aim, as set out by the Court of Appeal, was “to provide a service 
which was not merely effective in terms of practicality and efficiency, but also one which 
complied with the overarching policy of being “an employer and a public authority wholly 
committed to the promotion of equal opportunities and to requiring all its employees to act 
in a way which does not discriminate against others”.20 The Court did not, however, address 
or respond to Ms Ladele’s arguments that there was no sufficient connection of 
proportionality between this aim and the decision to designate Ms Ladele as a civil 
partnerships registrar.  
On the facts found by the first instance adjudicatory body, the Employment 
Tribunal, a decision not to designate Ms Ladele as a civil partnerships registrar would have 
had no adverse effect on equality of opportunity for same sex couples. There was no 
obligation on the local authority to designate her, and there would have been no adverse 
effect on the service provided to same sex couples had they decided not to do so. Had Ms 
Ladele remained as a marriage registrar, and had not been designated as a civil partnerships 
																																																								
20 Ladele, Court of Appeal, para 105. 
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registrar, it would have been legally impermissible under the domestic legislation for her 
to register or perform civil partnerships. There would, therefore, have been no question of 
her discriminating against others, and no inconsistency with the local authority’s equal 
opportunities policy. The local authority’s equal opportunities policy applied to religion as 
well as sexual orientation. A policy of forcing Ms Ladele to be designated as a civil 
partnerships registrar was in fact inconsistent with the local authority’s equal opportunities 
policy, since it involved discrimination against Ms Ladele. The same policy ultimately 
caused two other registrars in the same authority, one Muslim, one Christian, to leave their 
profession for reasons of conscience. Neither the local authority nor the national courts 
adequately considered the significance of this fact.  
In addition, other local authorities in the UK had chosen not to designate as civil 
partnership registrars those marriage registrars already in their employment who had a 
conscientious objection to performing the civil partnership role, at least where they could 
do so without any adverse effect on the service offered to same sex couples. There was no 
explanation as to why Islington could not and should not have done the same in this case. 
The decision to designate Ms Ladele with prior knowledge of her religious conscientious 
objection pursued no legitimate aim, therefore, and created an unnecessary situation 
whereby Ms Ladele was prevented from continuing in public service by reason of 
Islington’s refusal to accommodate her sincerely held religious beliefs. 
There is a further problem. Granting a wide margin of appreciation in cases such as 
this, where there has been no proper proportionality analysis by the national authorities or 
courts, gives little or no guidance to domestic courts, legislatures, or other public 
authorities in future cases, except to say that a very large proportion of cases are now 
subject to the margin of appreciation. This is an undesirable result and undermines the 
effective protection of human rights. Nor is this what the Court does in practice in other 
circumstances. For example, in Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen v 
United Kingdom,21 the Court itself conducted a balancing exercise between two rights both 
protected by the Convention, and explicitly denied a wide margin of appreciation to the 
United Kingdom authorities. So too, for example, where the rights of homosexuals to adopt 
children were restricted by public authorities in order to further what they considered the 
best interests of children, the Court has been prepared to intervene to protect the rights of 
the homosexual applicants and has not left the issue to the margin of appreciation.22 So 




21 Application no. 11002/05, judgment of 27 February 2007, (2007) 45 EHRR 34, at para 46. 
22 E.B. v France, application no. 43546/02, judgment of 22nd January 2008, (2008) 47 EHRR 21. 
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The issue of whether or not to accommodate the conscientious objections of 
registrars came before the United Kingdom Parliament in the same sex marriage Bill during 
2013 in a much more sustained and serious way than had occurred in the context of the 
earlier legislation introducing civil partnerships, at issue in Ladele.23 In the same sex 
marriage Bill, the issue was centre-stage in the Parliamentary debates, not least because of 
the publicity surrounding Ladele. 
 
Despite sustained attempts to provide for protections in domestic law for civil 
registrars, there is nothing in the Act that was passed that permits a registrar to refuse to 
conduct civil same sex marriages on the ground that she or he has a conscientious objection 
to doing so. Indeed, in one way, the Act is more restrictive than the position was under 
civil partnerships: as we have seen, local authorities that were willing to allow registrars 
not to conduct civil partnerships were permitted under the legislation to do so (even though 
Islington chose not to) -- the Civil Partnership Act 2004 had given local authorities the 
discretion to decide whether or not to designate their registrars as civil partnership 
registrars. However, the 2013 same sex marriage legislation accorded local authorities no 
discretion; it has effectively forced every local authority to designate their registrars as 
same sex marriage registrars, and then required them to conduct these marriages.  
 
The absence of protection for registrars in the civil context contrasts markedly with 
the protection from compulsion to conduct such marriages that is afforded to clergy (or 
others within religious organizations). Civil registrars will not be afforded the protection 
from compulsion that clergy have in relation to same sex marriages in the religious context. 
The Act includes a conscientious objection protection for Ministers or other religious 
figures from being required by their Church to take part in same-sex religious marriages, 
if the Minister or other religious figure objects. So a Liberal Jewish rabbi who objected to 
same sex marriages would not be ‘compelled’ to undertake such marriages even though 
Liberal Judaism in general has opted to conduct religious same sex marriages.  
 
One of the raft of amendments that Parliament examined was a much broader 
conscientious objection provision which would have applied to all those acting as registrars 
as a group in both civil and religious marriage contexts.24 This was intended to permit all 
																																																								
23 The issue had not even been raised in the Civil Partnership Bill, although it was considered briefly 
during the passage of the later Equality Act 2010.   
24  The proposed amendment provided:  
“Conscientious objection  
 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section, no registrar shall be under any duty, whether 
by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to conduct, be present at, carry out, participate 
in, or consent to the taking place of, a relevant marriage ceremony to which he has a conscientious 
objection. 
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registrars to exercise their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.  A 
conscientious objection clause, such as this, was not unprecedented in the British context. 
Section 4 of the (British) Abortion Act 1967, for example, allows individuals with 
conscientious objections to abstain from participating in abortions. The proposed 
amendment partly drew on that conscientious objection provision in the Abortion Act, in 
requiring that the registrar’s objection must be based on a sincerely held religious or other 
belief, and in placing the burden of proof on the registrar claiming to rely on it.  
 
But, in an attempted compromise, the proposed amendment was significantly more 
limited than that in operation in the abortion context. The amendment would not have 
allowed individuals to exercise a conscientious objection if doing so would result in same 
sex couples being unable to access this service. So, if sufficient numbers of registrars were 
not available in any area, a registrar with a conscientious objection would have a duty to 
conduct the same sex marriage. Therefore, no same sex couple would be prevented from 
marrying by reason of this amendment. However, both the Government and the Opposition 
opposed this amendment and it was defeated in both Houses of Parliament. 
 
III. THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY IN RELIGIOUS LITIGATION 
 
In this Part, I suggest that the Court in Ladele has fundamentally misunderstood 
what it means to consider a religious anti-discrimination claim, as opposed to one based in 
freedom of religion, and that in several critical respects the Court has adopted perspectives 
that appear to derive from the Court viewing the case through the freedom of religion lens 
rather than the anti-discrimination lens. In order to make this case, I begin, first, with a 
brief discussion of the teleology of religious freedom provisions before turning to contrast 
these with the teleology of religious anti-discrimination provisions. I then consider how 
the Court’s approach in Ladele appears much closer in several respects to the former than 
to the latter.  
Teleology of religious freedom protections 
 
The ECHR contains several different kinds of rights, or at least rights with different 
weights. So, we can distinguish those rights, such as the right to be free from torture,25 the 
																																																								
 (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall affect the duty of each registration authority to ensure that 
there is a sufficient number of relevant marriage registrars for its area to carry out in that area the functions 
of relevant marriage registrars. 
 (3) The conscientious objection must be based on a sincerely held religious or other belief. 
 (4) In any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection shall rest on the person 
claiming to rely on it.” 
 
25 Article 3 ECHR. 
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right not to be held in slavery,26 and the right to life,27 as rights that have very considerable 
weight.  In the case of torture and slavery, we even say that the right is “absolute” in the 
sense that the right has such weight that no other consideration is sufficiently important for 
it to trump that right. Other rights, in particular such rights as the right to a private life,28 
the right to freedom of speech,29 and the right to freedom of assembly,30 are structured so 
that other considerations can be taken into account in determining whether that right has 
been breached. In that sense, these rights are qualified rather than absolute. “Qualified” 
rights are thus highly contextualized, requiring judgements to be made about how the right 
is to be exercised in particular situations, and the limits on that right.  
 
The right to freedom of religion in the ECHR is partly of the first type, and partly 
of the second type.31 The right to ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion’ has two 
dimensions. First, there is the “freedom to change his religion or belief”; this is not subject 
to any limitation (we might say it is an “absolute” right). Second, there is the “freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance”; this is a “qualified” right, subject 
to limitations set out in the second part of Article 9 itself. The way in which this limitation 
provision is drafted (any limitations on the right must be “necessary in a democratic 
society”) leads the ECtHR to test for “proportionality”: that is, the Court considers if the 
purpose of the limitation of the right is legitimate, if the limitation is necessary for attaining 
that purpose, and if the measure strikes a proper balance between that purpose and the right 
that is being restricted.  
 
The inclusion of a right to freedom of religion in both aspects requires explanation 
and justification, but it is the second form on which particular attention has been lavished, 
because it is the ‘manifestation’ of religious practice in public that is more likely to meet 
with opposition, at least in modern circumstances.  There is now a sophisticated literature 
in both law and philosophy discussing why it is, or is not, appropriate to include special 
protections for freedom of religion as such. What is it about religion that should lead to it 
being given a specially tailored right? What is the value that a freedom of religion provision 
protects that can’t be equally well catered for by other provisions, such as freedom of 
speech, privacy, rights to marry, property rights, the right to education, and so forth? Think 
of it this way: assume, for the moment, that a Bill of Rights guaranteed freedom of 
association, freedom of speech, and freedom from discrimination (including on grounds of 
religion), would anything be lost if there were not a provision guaranteeing freedom of 
																																																								
26 Article 4 ECHR. 
27 Article 2 ECHR. 
28 Article 8 ECHR. 
29 Article 10 ECHR. 
30 Article 11 ECHR. 
31 Article 9 ECHR. 
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religion in the form that we have in the ECHR? For some, of course, there is no good 
justification for such special protection: religion should stand or fall according to the same 
standards as other systems of belief and action.  
 
For those who consider that there is a place for a freedom of religion provision, 
however, one of several different responses tends to be adopted. Freedom of religion is 
sometimes regarded as special because in the past religious disputes have proven so 
fractious and divisive that, for the sake of peace, it is inadvisable for the state to intervene 
in religious controversies unless there is a very strong reason to do so. This concern dates 
at least from the need to resolve the religious wars that scarred much of the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries in Europe.  Guaranteeing freedom of religion was seen as a means 
of guaranteeing civil peace. For British courts, guaranteeing freedom of religion for this 
reason remains of current significance. Lord Nicholls, for example, stressed how respecting 
another’s religious beliefs, “enables [us] to live in harmony.  This is one of the hallmarks 
of a civilized society.  Unhappily, all too often this hallmark has been noticeable by its 
absence.  Mutual tolerance has had a chequered history even in recent times.  The history 
of most countries, if not all, has been marred by the evil consequences of religious and 
other intolerance.”32  
 
The potential for civil strife if religious passions are not moderated by mutual 
tolerance therefore provides an important background consideration against which to 
interpret the role of freedom of religion. Where courts have a feeling that accepting claims 
to freedom of religion is likely to increase rather than decrease religious tensions, they tend 
to react negatively. It is noteworthy, for example, that in upholding the compromise that a 
school had worked out over which types of Islamic dress to permit, Lord Bingham stressed 
the “period of harmony … to which the uniform policy was thought to contribute”, how 
the compromise was “acceptable to mainstream Muslim opinion”, how the changes 
proposed by the claimant “would or might have significant adverse repercussions”, and 
how the Court would be “irresponsible” to override the school “on a matter as sensitive as 
this.”33 The “confrontational”34 and the “threatening”35 nature of the way in which the issue 
was raised by the claimants, and the sense that an “extremist version of the Muslim 
religion”36 might be being promoted, will not have helped the applicant either. In the same 
case, Lady Hale was even more explicit: “The school’s task is … to promote the ability of 
people of diverse races, religions and cultures to live together in harmony.”37  
																																																								
32 In R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] 2 AC 246, at [15], 
per Lord Nicholls. 
33 R (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High School [2007] 1 AC at 34 (Lord Bingham). 
34 At [80], per Lord Scott. 
35 At [79], per Lord Scott. 
36 At [65], per Lord Hoffmann. 
37 At [96]. 
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There is a second, alternative argument adopted by those who consider that there is 
a place for a freedom of religion provision: that there is there is some particular added 
value that religious freedom protects that the other rights do not, such as the importance of 
individual conscience, or the value of being reminded of the importance of the spiritual. 
The parallels between privacy and freedom of religion in this regard are in some ways quite 
striking.  Freedom of religion emphasizes membership in a religion as something that 
involves private beliefs and activity. Indeed, there is much in common more generally 
between the idea of a zone of privacy and the protection of freedom of religion. The 
protection of the first aspect of freedom of religion distinguished earlier, the forum 
internum as it is called, has much in common with a privacy idea. Under freedom of 
religion more generally, the approach taken is one that emphasizes the singular importance 
of the individual’s choice to act on a particular belief. It is similar to deciding whether or 
not to engage in sexual activity, and of what type, both choices which are regarded as 
private choices. The idea of toleration is also central to both. As with privacy in the sexual 
orientation context, under freedom of religion judges are not called on to approve the 
religion or belief that claims protection, simply to be prepared to tolerate it. Freedom of 
religion, in this justification, protects the free choices of autonomous individuals within a 
zone of beliefs. One can say that this is the primary understanding of the freedom of 
religion protected by Article 9 ECHR.  Indeed, the Court has said as such: ‘… religious 
freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience …’38  
 
These aspects of freedom of religion are often seen as involving different aspects 
of what American jurisprudence would call the First Amendment “free exercise” of 
religion.  We have, however, already identified another aspect of freedom of religion, what 
we have termed ‘freedom from religion’, or at least freedom from religion imposed as an 
exercise of state authority. The limited version of this aspect of religious freedom adopted 
in the ECHR amounts to a requirement that the state should not coerce individuals to adopt 
a religion, and should not favour one religion over another. The ECtHR has held that 
national governments cannot unreasonably discriminate between religions with regard to 
the requirements that the church must fulfill.39  So, Article 9 safeguards the right of one 
religion to be free to operate on conditions equal to other churches, especially where the 
action of the State causes an unjustified restriction on the exercise of religious freedom in 
its collective dimension.40  
 
The relationship between the individual and the collective dimensions is 
problematic. Understanding the value of freedom of religion as primarily the protection of 
																																																								
38 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 55 (emphasis added). 
39 Canea Catholic Church v. Greece (1997) 27 EHRR 521 (Commission Decision) 
40 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova, (2002) 35 EHRR 13. 
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a zone of privacy is in tension with what we can call the ‘collective dimension’ of organized 
religion. The ECtHR has recognized that “religious communities traditionally and 
universally exist in the form of organised structures. They abide by rules which are often 
seen by followers as being of a divine origin.”41 Indeed, the ECtHR regularly emphasizes 
that states should not underestimate the importance of the community dimension of the 
right.42 Whilst we have seen that the Court said that “religious freedom is primarily a matter 
of individual conscience” the Court went on to say, in the same case, and immediately 
following this, that Article 9 “also implies, inter alia, freedom to manifest one's religion, 
alone and in private, or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those 
whose faith one shares”.43  
 
How do the courts address the relationship between the protection of an individual 
private right, and claims based on the protection of this collective dimension? The answer, 
unfortunately, is “in some confusion”, and in a multiplicity of voices.  One approach is to 
seek to individualize the collective dimension. Freedom of religion in its collective 
dimension is seen as important partly because it furthers the autonomy of the individual. 
So, the Court has said that: “… the autonomous existence of religious communities … 
directly concerns … the effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion by all its 
active members. Were the organisational life of the community not protected by Article 9 
of the Convention, all other aspects of the individual's freedom of religion would become 
vulnerable.”44  
 
In other cases, however, the Court considers that freedom of religion in both its 
individual and collective aspects is important for a third main reason, that such freedom is 
in the interests of the society as a whole, not just in the interests of the individual believer 
or collectively organized religion. In particular, the Court has viewed the collective aspect 
of freedom of religion as going beyond safeguarding the particular religious community in 
question, considering that “it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and 
the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been 
dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.”45 “Indeed,” the Court says, “the autonomous 
existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society 
and is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords.” For the 
ECtHR, it is important to protect “the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural 
identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts”.46 To 
repeat, this does not mean that the state (or the Court) is called on to approve the religious 
																																																								
41 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 55, at [62]. 
42 Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397, para 31. 
43 Hasan, at [60]. 
44 Hasan at [62] (emphasis added). 
45 Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, para 57. 
46 Moscow Branch, para 61. 
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beliefs; it is the existence of the variety of beliefs that is important, presumably irrespective 
of whether they are “correct” or not. 
 
We can see, therefore, that there are three main approaches that characterize the 
ECHR’s interpretation of Article 9: an approach based on maintaining civil peace; an 
approach based on securing protection of private choices; and an approach based on 
ensuring the pluralism of the public space. The Court draws on each of these in its 
jurisprudence but has never, to my knowledge, made clear which, if any, has priority over 
the others, and the precise relationship between them remains largely unresolved. 
 
Teleology of religious discrimination protections 
 
Religion often becomes, independent of belief, a social status, a badge of identity, 
similar in many ways to other forms of identity, such as ethnic or cultural identity. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, arguments concerning the place of religion in the public or private 
spheres are now frequently reframed as issues of discrimination and equality. This appears 
to be the result of at least two significant developments.  The first is that legal practitioners 
now more frequently identify anti-discrimination arguments as providing ways of avoiding 
the uncertainties engendered by the jurisprudence on freedom of religion. The second is 
that the growth of equality and discrimination arguments generally, and in particular the 
greater focus on the protection of various identities, has brought to the fore the ‘identity’ 
dimensions of religion. 
 
Several similarities between freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination 
on the basis of religion are initially quite striking. There is, in particular, a degree of overlap 
between the interpretation of freedom of religion and the religious discrimination 
provisions in so far as freedom of religion itself encompasses an equality dimension. We 
have seen that freedom of religion has been interpreted as encompassing a degree of 
equality between religions. Indeed, one of the ways in which a breach of freedom of 
religion is proven is by pointing to more favourable treatment being accorded to another 
religion when, other things being equal, they should have been treated similarly.47 This 
																																																								
47 Under Article 9 ECHR, states cannot unreasonably discriminate between religions with regard to 
the requirements that the church must fulfill (Canea Catholic Church v. Greece (1997) 27 EHRR 521 
(Commission Decision).  So, Article 9 safeguards the right of one religion to be free to operate on conditions 
equal to other recognized churches, especially where the action of the State causes an unjustified restriction 
on the exercise of religious freedom in its collective dimension (Metropolitan Church). The US Supreme 
Court has also frequently adopted a non-discrimination approach in interpreting the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses: Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 269 n. 6 (1981); Lamb’s Chapel v Center Moriches School 
District, 113 S Ct 2141 (1993); McDaniel v Paty, 435 US 618 (1978).  See further, JA Sekulow, JM 
Handerson, and KE Broyles, Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality as Guiding 
Principle in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 351 (1995-6), at 391, fn 231 
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intuition is captured in the ECHR through Article 14, the original intention of which was 
to provide that these substantive rights should not been delivered in a discriminatory way.  
 
Beyond these similarities, however, textual differences emerge. In Article 9, 
freedom of religion (along with thought, conscience and belief) is singled out for special 
treatment, in the sense that freedom of religion has a particular provision that is devoted 
primarily to enunciating this freedom, whereas the provision prohibiting religious 
discrimination is located among several other grounds for non-discrimination, including 
race, gender, etc. A second difference is more institutional -- unlike the treatment of 
‘freedom of religion’, freedom from religious discrimination has, in the past, often been 
the subject of detailed legal treatment in ordinary statute law as well as being sometimes 
addressed through constitutional or human rights provisions.48  
 
In light of this, there are two major problems in identifying the telos of the anti-
discrimination approach when applied to religion. The first is the relationship between 
‘freedom of religion’ and ‘freedom from religious discrimination’. Is there anything 
fundamentally distinctive between these rights? Do the differences in drafting and 
institutional elaboration discussed above denote a significant substantive difference? Or do 
the two rights seek to do essentially the same thing? In short, does it matter whether an 
issue is presented as one of freedom of religion, or one of religious discrimination? The 
second problem arises from concerns about the internal coherence of the protectorate 
included in anti-discrimination law. Anti-discrimination law frequently prohibits 
discrimination against an expanding list of protected categories. We might seek to explain 
the inclusion of religion as a protected category simply as the result of interest-group 
lobbying, political influence, and historical contingency, but whether or not that approach 
accounts for the development in a way that convinces historians and political scientists, it 
has not proven sufficient for lawyers and judges, who tend to assume that, if there is a list, 
then there is some principled connection between the grounds protected that goes beyond 
historical contingency and politics.  
 
Relationship between ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘freedom from discrimination’ 
 
I’ll consider, first, the relationship between ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘freedom 
from discrimination’, and suggest that the differences between these provisions are more 
fundamental than simply differences in drafting style, material scope, legal source, and 
limitations, however important these are in practice. The potential differences between the 
two rights also appears to have been recognised, at least to a limited extent, in legislative 
																																																								
48 Scholarly discussion has frequently identified how little sustained jurisprudential analysis has 
been accorded to this approach in contrast to the massive scholarly attention accorded to freedom of religion. 
Little academic attention has been given to the inclusion of religion as one of the protected categories in anti-
discrimination law. 
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drafting.  In both European Union and UK anti-discrimination law, there are several 
exceptions from the religious anti-discrimination provisions aiming to ensure that freedom 
of religion is not breached,49 thus indicating that the two rights are thought to incorporate 
different principles. Turning to the way in which these types of provisions have been 
judicially interpreted, we notice several differences between these provisions. 
 
First, the discrimination provisions are interpreted as being essentially 
comparative.50 The approach adopted to the interpretation of the religious discrimination 
provision emphasizes the nature of discrimination as involving the less favourable 
treatment of one person in comparison with another person, based on the differences in 
their religion. We saw that approach being adopted by the Court in Ladele. Freedom of 
religion protections, on the other hand, are not seen as essentially comparative.  There can 
be a breach of a provision guaranteeing freedom of religion, irrespective of the same 
treatment being accorded (or not accorded) to adherents of all other religions, or, indeed, 
everyone else.  Freedom of religion, at least in theory, protects the holding of a belief of 
that religion and its manifestation on a non-comparative basis; someone complaining of a 
breach of freedom of religion does not need to complain that someone else has been treated 
more favourably.  
 
There is a way of thinking about a second possible difference between freedom of 
religion and religious anti-discrimination approaches by using an analogy drawn from 
sexual orientation. There has long been an important debate within the community of gay 
activists in Europe, as well as elsewhere, as to the appropriate strategy to adopt in 
addressing the treatment suffered by those who are gay. Essentially, the alternatives were 
whether to adopt a strategy based on an argument from privacy, or one based on equality.  
 
In the early days of gay legal activism, the argument from privacy was highly 
successful in challenging the criminalization of sexual practices, particularly those 
associated with male homosexuality, such as sodomy. The essence of the argument from 
privacy was that the right to privacy protected activities within a zone of sexual intimacy 
from state regulation because what one did within that zone of sexual intimacy was, quite 
simply, not the law’s business. The advantage from an activist’s perspective was that 
(conservative) judges were not called on to approve what was done within that zone of 
privacy, simply tolerate it. This tolerance was based on the need to recognize the 
																																																								
49 Compare the exception in the case of employment by an organization that has a particular religious 
ethos to permit such organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion or belief, but only where the nature 
of those activities or the context in which they are carried out, constitutes a genuine occupational 
qualification. 
50 With the notable exception of certain forms of gender discrimination, in some jurisdictions, such 
as pregnancy discrimination under European Union anti-discrimination law. 
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desirability of protecting the free choices of autonomous individuals within the zone of 
sexual intimacy. 
 
The perceived disadvantage of the argument from privacy for gay activists was that 
it appeared to provide very little opportunity to challenge other restrictions on homosexuals 
successfully (other than those on same-sex sexual conduct, that is). After the initial success 
of the privacy strategy in striking down criminal sodomy laws, the privacy strategy was 
considered by many to be too limited in what it could be used to achieve. Even more 
importantly, however, it was not just limited, but also limiting, in that it appeared to 
conceptualize the relationship between gays and the wider society only in terms of sexual 
intimacy, and only in terms of protecting conduct rather than status.  Once gays came out 
of the closet, into the public domain, into the light, then the privacy argument had very 
little purchase: privacy did not protect homosexuals from being treated badly, it only 
protected particular actions associated with homosexuals from being penalized (provided 
they were in private).51  
 
The alternative approach that came to dominate gay rights litigation was based on 
discrimination and equality rather than privacy.  A shift to equality would mean that gay 
activists would no longer have to focus on the particular substantive right of privacy as the 
basis for challenging particular treatment, but instead would concentrate on the use of the 
“status” of sexual orientation, similar to the way in which the use of race or gender or 
disability came to be seen. This shift to equality was considered to be attractive, in short, 
because it provided an opportunity to focus on homosexual status rather than homosexual 
sexual practices alone; it protected gays in the public sphere (as opposed to only in the 
bedroom) and, because it was based on a conception of discrimination that was 
comparative, it emphasized, on every occasion, that the starting point for analysis was that 
homosexuals and non-homosexuals should be treated as equivalent.52  
 
This opportunity to validate rather than just tolerate gays was taken up with 
enthusiasm by gay activists, leading to considerable advances in the perception of 
homosexuals, who were reclassified (as it were) to become a group worthy of protection, 
in ways very similar to women, racial minorities, and so on. In this sense, Justice Scalia 
was correct in Romer v Evans when he said: “Quite understandably, they [meaning gay 
activists] devote … political power to achieving …  not merely a grudging social 
																																																								
51 John Finnis described this position in 1994 as ‘the standard modern position. He supported 
decriminalization of private homosexual conduct, whilst rejecting the equation of homosexuality with 
hetrosexuality as equivalent, see John M Finnis, Law, Morality and ‘Sexual Orientation’, 69 Notre Dame 
Law Review 1049 (1994). 
52 See, for example, Larry Cata Backer, Exposing the Perversion of Toleration: The 
Decriminalization of Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal 
Toleration, 45 Florida Law Review 755 (1993). 
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toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.”53  Quoting Jacobs, he considered 
“[t]he task of gay rights proponents is to move the center of public discourse along a 
continuum from the rhetoric of disapprobation, to rhetoric of tolerance, and finally to 
affirmation”.54 Adopting equality as the basis for its legal strategy contributed to this goal. 
“Affirmation” means that these particular choices are not just accepted, but are also 
regarded as “right”, such that we cannot reject them, and the state (through the courts) is 
seen to prefer that view over a contesting view.  
 
How is this diversion relevant for an analysis of claims to religious discrimination? 
A significant part of the appeal for litigants in using an argument based in freedom from 
religious discrimination is the opportunity it offers to benefit from similar affirmation of 
their status as religious persons, particularly when they operate in the public sphere, 
broadly defined. The opportunity to secure affirmation is notoriously more limited using 
freedom of religion. Not only is there an ambiguity as to whether the courts will apply a 
narrow ‘autonomy’ approach, significantly limiting religion to the private sphere, there is 
also a focus on particular ‘conduct’, viz the manifestation of a set of religious practices, 
rather than a protection of the status of being religious in the much broader range of 
circumstances covered by anti-discrimination law. 
 
Grounds of protection in anti-discrimination law 
 
Whilst the benefits for conscientious-believer litigants appear to be clear, there 
remains a significant problem, however.  This is the problem of how far, if at all, courts 
are willing to see religion as truly analogous to other grounds that they regard as 
appropriately protected by anti-discrimination law, such as race, or gender, or sexual 
orientation. This requires us to consider the second problem in understanding the telos of 
freedom from religious discrimination. Trying to explain why some grounds are included 
within the protectorate of anti-discrimination law, whilst others are not, has generated a 
substantial debate in different jurisdictions, one that is by no means over.  
 
Initially, the predominant academic explanation in several jurisdictions outside the 
United States followed that adopted by the United States Supreme Court: the common 
element that linked those grounds that were protected by anti-discrimination law, and that 
distinguished these from other grounds that were not protected, was said to be that the 
grounds that were included in the protectorate were all ‘immutable characteristics,’ 
meaning that these characteristics were not chosen and could not be altered by an 
individual. In 1969, the Harvard Law Review observed that “… race and lineage are 
																																																								
53 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996). 
54 Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay Rights Movement, 1969-
1991, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1993). 
	 23	
congenital and unalterable traits over which an individual has no control and for which he 
should not receive neither blame nor reward.”55  
 
The immutability theory has important implications for how we are likely to view 
the inclusion of “religion” in the grounds of protection, because it radically distinguishes 
racial discrimination from much religious discrimination. Whereas the latter is thought to 
protect individuals because they act on the basis of freely made choices, the former protects 
individuals because they were acted upon on the basis of characteristics that were not freely 
chosen because immutable. It is this distinction that surfaced some years ago in the British 
courts, when Lord Justice Sedley in Eweida v. British Airways56 distinguished protection 
from discrimination on the grounds of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and 
civil partnership, race, sex and sexual orientation, from protection from discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief.  He observed: “One cannot help observing that all of these 
apart from religion or belief are objective characteristics of individuals: religion and belief 
alone are matters of choice.”57  
 
In the place of its birth, the “immutability” theory has, however, long been regarded 
skeptically, as being both under- and over-inclusive. Lawrence Tribe’s comment 
demonstrates how it is over-inclusive: “Intelligence, height, and strength are all immutable 
for a particular individual but legislation that distinguishes on the basis of these criteria is 
not generally thought to be constitutionally suspect.”58 Jack Balkin’s analysis points to why 
it is under-inclusive: “Discrimination against blacks … is not unjust simply because race 
is an immutable characteristic. Focusing on immutability per se confuses biological with 
sociological considerations. It confuses the physical existence of the trait with what the 
trait means in a social system … The question is not whether a trait is immutable, but 
whether there has been a history of using the trait to create a system of social meanings, or 
define a social hierarchy, that helps dominate and oppress people. Any conclusions about 
the importance of immutability already presuppose a view about background social 
structure.”59  
 
Attempting to isolate a principled reason why some groups are protected from being 
discriminated against and others not, brings us face to face with a major unresolved issue 
in anti-discrimination law theory: what is it that anti-discrimination law is attempting to 
do? Whilst the ‘immutability’ theory has lost support, there has been no single alternative 
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that has emerged as a commonly accepted replacement, at least in the European context. 
Instead, several major competing theories have attempted to answer this question.  
 
One theory is that the protected characteristics comprise a list of those 
characteristics that are irrelevant to the performance of a job, or to the distribution of a 
benefit, and that it is therefore the use of these characteristics should be prohibited in these 
contexts. This approach focuses on the function of anti-discrimination law on eradicating 
irrational decision-making, and requiring decision makers to act on the basis of “merit”. 
This explanation has always carried a powerful punch, because protection from 
discrimination on this basis is not just for the benefit of the individual who is protected, but 
it is also in the general interest that only relevant criteria should be adopted. And in the 
context of religion, we can also see that this approach has considerable resonance -- it is, 
in some contexts, simply irrelevant what a person’s beliefs (religious or not) are. To this 
extent, there is a clear overlap between the concern to protect freedom of religion and the 
concern to prohibit discrimination on religious grounds: both are concerned with 
preventing others (the state, an employer) from messing with a person’s set of beliefs unless 
this is absolutely necessary. In this theory, whether or not the protected characteristic was 
the result of free choice by the ‘victim’ was not important; rather, what was important was 
the relevance of the criterion to the choice made by the decision-maker. 
 
The argument from irrelevance is not, however, particularly convincing if it is 
presented as a complete explanation for the inclusion of the list of protected characteristics 
usually covered, not least because in some cases the use of a protected characteristic is 
highly relevant but is still prohibited (think of the prohibition of some actuarial calculations 
based on gender of pension contributions under European Union law60). In the context of 
the prohibition of religious discrimination, the “irrelevance” theory is also unconvincing 
as an all-encompassing explanation, because religious discrimination is prohibited in 
employment even where it is “relevant”, such as where an employer is prohibited from 
discriminating against a person on grounds of his or her religion even where the employer’s 
customers would strongly prefer not to have a person of that religion serving them.  For 
the employer to take the employee’s religion into account in deciding whether to hire that 
person could not be described as “irrational”, or based on “irrelevant” considerations. We 
prohibit the employer from so acting in spite of it being relevant in some circumstances. 
 
Of the alternatives to the “irrelevance” theory, two others have proven of particular 
importance. Both of these involve, to some degree, a collective dimension. When the 
paradigmatic grounds of anti-discrimination law were race and gender, the most popular 
alternative theory was probably one based on “redistribution” to particular disadvantaged 
groups.  This theory captured the idea that the function of anti-discrimination law was a 
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modest redistribution of opportunities for employment, housing, and other benefits from 
advantaged to disadvantaged groups. The source of the disadvantage was clear -- it was the 
race or the gender of the person -- and therefore it was appropriate to prohibit the use of 
those characteristics that would result in these groups being even more disadvantaged.  
Owen Fiss termed this approach, the “group disadvantaging principle”. This principle, and 
its similar cousins, concentrated on the disadvantage (often economic) that the group 
suffered or would suffer, and associated that disadvantage with the fact that the group was 
identified by its possession of the prohibited characteristic.  
 
The “group disadvantaging principle” explains the inclusion of religion in Europe 
only to a limited extent. So, in Northern Ireland, where religion plays a social role 
equivalent to ethnicity and there was a significant connection between being Catholic and 
being disadvantaged, the group-disadvantaging principle explains and justifies the 
inclusion of religion in anti-discrimination law. So, too, where there is a strong connection 
elsewhere between ethnicity, religion and economic disadvantage, such as we see as 
regards the position of Muslims in Britain, prohibiting religious discrimination seems to 
map neatly onto the group disadvantaging principle. Except in these contexts, however, the 
redistributive approach seems singularly ill-suited to explain the inclusion of ‘religion’ as 
a general category of prohibited characteristic.  
 
A more recent theory, and probably the most popular currently, is the theory of 
protection based on the desirability of protecting “minority identity”. Unlike the “group 
disadvantaging principle,” this seeks to explain the categories of protected characteristics 
by focusing on the importance of protecting social groups with which individuals self-
identify and of which they behave as a part, adopting the shared attitudes and practices of 
the group to such an extent that their membership in the group becomes an important part 
of how they view themselves. These identities should be protected, it is said, because 
discrimination on the basis of this identity is an attack on a central aspect of the personality 
of those whose self-identity is tied up with the group. Not all identities are protected, of 
course, only those that are particularly associated with a ‘minority’ group, with ‘minority’ 
in this context often being a proxy for “those who are disadvantaged as a result of their 
minority status”. 
 
This theory seems particularly well suited to the inclusion of grounds such as sexual 
orientation within the protectorate of anti-discrimination law. The legal move from using 
privacy to using equality arguments in the context of sexual orientation coincided with a 
social movement that increasingly saw sexual orientation as an identity rather than simply 
as a description of sexual conduct. The development of sexual orientation as a mark of 
identity made it that much easier to incorporate it as a protected ground of discrimination. 
With that move, the issue ceased to be whether sexual orientation was chosen or not, or 
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whether sexual orientation was an “immutable characteristic” or not.61 And it was clear 
that the group was a “minority”, whose members were disadvantaged by being part of that 
group. And such an approach is not entirely absent from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
We have seen earlier that the ECtHR, when considering freedom of religion, accepts the 
connection between religion and identity. Protecting religious choices is seen as important 
not only because we respect autonomy, but also because these choices relate to the 
individual’s identity. So far, however, the identity-based approach has not been extensively 
tested in the ECtHR as an appropriate interpretation of Article 14’s prohibition of religious 
discrimination, and its likely adoption by the Court is uncertain. 
 
If the interpretation by British courts of prohibitions on religious discrimination is 
any basis for predicting future trends elsewhere, including in the ECtHR, equality norms 
in the context of religion will be seen, rather, as simply another way of putting the freedom 
of religion approach into practice, and therefore as something of an anomaly in the equality 
law sphere.  So, in recent British cases, for example, the anti-discrimination provisions 
dealing with religion have been interpreted as encapsulating a choice-based approach 
borrowed directly from freedom of religion rather than an identity-based approach 
borrowed from race cases. So too, the provisions are interpreted as encapsulating a view 
that religion is a private matter rather than a public matter, again borrowing directly from 
freedom of religion; and as focused on conduct rather than identity, again borrowed directly 
from freedom of religion. What seems to emerge from what is, admittedly, still a somewhat 
patchy jurisprudence is an approach that seeks to distance religious equality from all the 
other types of status equality, and to relegate religious equality to become simply another 
variant of freedom of religion, and therefore subject to the same type of constraints as 
freedom of religion. 
 
This emerging approach, if such it is, seems to be due in part to structure of Article 
14 itself. As we have seen in the discussion of Ladele, Article 14 is parasitic on other 
Convention rights, meaning that the Court has determined that Article 14 does not come 
into play unless the case raises an issue that is at least “within the ambit” of another 
Convention right. The early jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights generally viewed 
the function of Article 14 as peripheral and subsidiary to the other substantive rights.  
Indeed, the Court in this early phase seems to have regarded the role of Article 14 as 
essentially a way of ensuring that the fundamental right in issue was more widely 
distributed, rather than being important in its own right. This is an important reason why, 
in so many early cases, an Article 14 claim was not decided on its merits after it was found 
that that another substantive right had been breached -- Article 14 was not thought to bring 
																																																								
61 Adopting either position would have been problematic for (some) gay rights advocates who were 
radically split on the issue, see Janet E Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 26 UCLA Law Rev 915 (1989). 
	 27	
anything additional to the table. In the context of litigation involving a claim of religious 
discrimination, a classic move was to argue that the case raised issues within the ambit of 
Article 9 on freedom of religion, rather than some other Article, and thus the scene was set 
for Article 9 to become the dominant focus of attention, replacing the Article 14 
discrimination issue.  
 
The approach that regards Article 14 as subsidiary and peripheral has more recently 
been significantly modified, and eradicating certain types of status inequality is often now 
seen as a worthy goal in itself. This approach has come to dominate the adjudication of 
claims based on race, gender and sexual orientation. These grounds (and some others) are 
considered by the Court to merit a particularly high degree of protection because adverse 
treatment based on these grounds is thought to merit particular condemnation.  In these 
cases, the function of Article 14 is not to act as merely ancillary to the other substantive 
rights but to take on a role in protecting individuals from particular types of status 
discrimination. When engaging with discrimination on these grounds, the Court now 
interprets Article 14 in ways much more similar to the classic statutory anti-discrimination 
law provisions in domestic law, such as those prohibiting racial and gender discrimination. 
In the ECtHR, when an Article 14 claim engages this set of grounds (race, gender, etc) 
there is a clear ‘restriction in the national margin of appreciation’.62  
 
And, again, this approach is not absent from Article 14 jurisprudence engaging with 
religious discrimination. We have seen that in several cases the Court has interpreted 
Article 14 read with Article 9 in somewhat similar ways, in particular where it would 
appear from the facts of the case that the power of the state was being used to allow one 
religion to dominate another. Thus the well-known prejudice against non-Orthodox 
churches in Greece,63 and Jehovah’s Witnesses more generally,64 has led the Court to 
identify these religions as, effectively, ‘minorities’ and thus subject to greater protection. 
In these contexts, where heightened scrutiny is required, the Court is also more likely to 
impose a positive obligation on the state to protect these minority religions from non-state 
actors,65 and impose an obligation of reasonable accommodation on the state.66 Where the 
Court does not view the religious anti-discrimination claim as involving, in effect, a claim 
to disadvantaged minority group status, the Court does not appear to be willing to grant the 
claimant membership of a “suspect category”, and is anxious to allow to states a wide 
margin of appreciation. The Court’s approach, therefore, is very context driven. 
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Ladele: confusing freedom of religion with freedom from religious discrimination 
 
That is why we have cases such as Ladele, in which the Court appears to understand 
the telos of the religious discrimination provision as the same (or very similar) to that of 
freedom of religion (and thus, crucially, bringing the same limitations into anti-
discrimination law as occurs in freedom of religion. This was the approach adopted in the 
English Court of Appeal, and it will be remembered that the ECtHR essentially 
incorporated of the English Court of Appeal’s justifications for refusing to uphold her claim 
of discrimination into its judgment. There are several important examples. 
 
First, the national court, it will be remembered, specifically stated that Ms Ladele’s 
refusal to carry out same sex partnership ceremonies “caused offence to [her] gay 
colleagues.” Second, the national court stated that the local authority’s requirement that 
she should carry out this duty “did not prevent her from worshipping as she wished.” In a 
freedom of religion context, both these justifications might (just) be acceptable (based on 
the avoidance of civil strife and the privacy rationales), but neither of them has hitherto 
been regarded as acceptable in an anti-discrimination law context in so far as discrimination 
on other grounds is concerned. We do not accept as a justification for indirect racial 
discrimination that the act or omission that the person of colour wishes to do or not to do 
will cause “offence” to others. Nor, in the gender discrimination context, would we regard 
the woman’s ability to do other things as relevant to whether she was discriminated against 
in doing this thing. 
 
Third, the national court states that one of the reasons for regarding the 
discrimination as justified was that she was “working for a public authority”. This seems 
to imply that public authorities should be neutral work places in which religious values 
should remain excluded. And much freedom of religion jurisprudence seems to follow this 
line of thinking, viewing the protection as essentially guaranteeing the right to private 
religious practice, following a dominant stand of the “secularization” literature in doing so. 
As societies modernize, we are told, they should lose the vestiges of public religion and 
ultimately become committed to secularism. Religion becomes publicly marginalised – or, 
“privatized” – and ‘excluded from the public realm.’67 This approach may be consistent 
with a narrow freedom of religion approach, in which the state’s duty (and possibly the 
duty of its employees) is to remain neutral, but it seems a very strange approach to adopt 
in the anti-discrimination context. I have never encountered a judicial decision in any other 
anti-discrimination context that accepts that indirect discrimination can be justified by the 
fact that the employee is an employee of that state body. 
																																																								




Fourth, it will be remembered that the ECtHR says that the Court “generally allows 
the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to striking a balance 
between competing Convention rights …”.68 But the Court here again demonstrates a 
significant confusion. Remember that the Court accepted the applicant’s position that the 
issue that Ms Ladele presented was a discrimination claim, not a freedom of religion claim. 
And recollect that the local authority’s policy was essentially grounded in the avoidance of 
discrimination.  This means, therefore, that in Ladele’s case there were no competing 
Convention rights (in the sense of a clash between Article 14 and Article 9), but rather 
competing aspects of the same Convention right, the Article 14 right not to be discriminated 
against. The Court avoids considering how best to deal with conflicts within the right to 
non-discrimination, by lazily considering the issue as one of competing Convention rights.  
 
Fifth, the English Court of Appeal states that the duties that Ms Ladele was required 
to perform, involved “purely secular tasks,” and that her refusal to carry them out was “not 
based on a core part of her religion.” Both of these aspects of the justification also sound 
in freedom of religion jurisprudence, not in anti-discrimination jurisprudence. In both 
cases, their inclusion in the list that the national Court brought forward to justify indirect 
discrimination, a list that we have seen the ECtHR appears to incorporate by reference into 
its own judgment, seems calculated to undermine the initial finding that there was a prima 
facie case of discrimination. Even assuming it is correct that she was involved in “purely 
secular tasks” and that her refusal was not based on a “core part of her religion”, why are 
either of these points relevant in an anti-discrimination context, except at the stage of 
determining whether there is a prima facie case of discrimination? The ECtHR having, 
quite correctly, adopted a clear understanding of what it was necessary for Ms Ladele to 
establish at the prima facie stage, then seems to row back, bringing back into consideration 
at the justification stage just those types of considerations that were rejected at the prima 
facie violation stage. The only plausible explanation seems to be that these types of 
considerations might be relevant at the justification stage of a freedom of religion claim, 
which would seem to illustrate either that the Court is hopelessly muddled in its approach, 
or that something more intriguing is going on. 
 
What that “extra something” may be, is difficult to pin down, as there is nothing in 
the Court’s judgment in Ladele that even hints at an explanation. Two possibilities come 
to mind, however. First, the unacceptability of some religious beliefs might be thought to 
be sufficient in itself to distinguish the ground of “religion and belief” from other protected 
characteristics, and this may lead courts to push religious discrimination claims back to the 
safer shores of freedom of religion where there is more experience of dealing with bigoted 
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religions.  Gwyneth Pitt, for example, argues that unlike other protected grounds, which 
“express a consensus about particular values of equality and the irrelevance of certain 
characteristics,” the protection of religion and belief “potentially provides protection for 
the holders of completely abhorrent, or irrational, or bigoted beliefs, including those which 
would certainly not accord equal rights to others if they were to prevail”, and that this 
“highlights a difference between the religion or belief ground compared with other 
protected grounds.”69 
 
The Court may thus be interpreting the prohibitions on religious discrimination in 
what they consider to be a very different context from that in which they interpret the laws 
prohibiting racial or gender discrimination. Up to this point, they have become used to 
seeing religious discrimination primarily in an ethnic minority context, and seem to have 
considerable difficulty in accepting that religious identity is a status that is to be protected 
irrespective of whether that religious identity is connected with a minority ethnic identity 
or not. In addition, even when the religious discrimination claim does arise from a 
community that is a minority ethnic community, the claim to protection is met with a post-
multicultural scepticism, particularly where any whiff of illiberalism in the religious 
practices of that group is perceived to be operating.  
 
If this is what is going on, then it would seem that, in the long run, the language 
and claims of nondiscrimination and equality may be of greater harm than help to religious 
claimants. Equality language and anti-discrimination claims bear the impression of certain 
core progressive commitments that do not sit at all easily with the views of some religious 
believers. But it is contrary to the state’s (and the Court’s) duty of neutrality and 
impartiality to allow the state (or the Court) to assess the legitimacy of a system of religious 
beliefs, or the way in which those beliefs are expressed, and the Court is more likely to 
prefer dealing with the problem in another way, such as viewing the claim through the 
narrower lens of freedom of religion. 
 
A second possible explanation for the unease in treating religious discrimination 
claims as on a par with claims of discrimination on other grounds (except where such 
claims are closely related to racial and ethnic discrimination) may be because of the wider 
implications of doing so. Perhaps sensing that they are likely to get into highly problematic 
water if religious discrimination litigation becomes widespread, the ECtHR has avoided 
these future problems by invoking the margin of appreciation, thus leaving the issue to the 
national authorities.70 The Grand Chamber adopted a similar approach in Lautsi, the case 
dealing with the display of the crucifix in Italian public school classrooms.71 One way of 
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interpreting such decisions is to view the Court as according to European states 
considerable discretion to weigh religious values according to their own criteria of 
evaluation, thus giving discretion to states also as to how to deal with the problem, and 
allowing to Court in particular to avoid dealing with the highly sensitive issue of 
established (or quasi-established) religions in many states. 
 
Whilst this approach may satisfy those concerned with protecting national 
sovereignty,72 it does little to address other understandings of why religion should be 
protected since it places the state in the driving seat, allowing it to decide which, if any, 
religious values to uphold. It seems, if anything, a throwback to the original approach to 
freedom of religion adopted in the Treaty of Westphalia, in which princes got to determine 
the religion of the populace in their territories. So, for example, the ECtHR’s use of the 
margin of appreciation to address issues concerned with abortion,73 or the wearing of 
Islamic dress,74 or conscientious objection to same-sex relationships,75 recognizes the 
diversity of the values upheld in different national traditions. As the ECtHR stated in the 
Leyla Sahin case, concerning the wearing of Islamic dress: “Rules in this sphere will 
consequently vary from one country to another according to national traditions and the 
requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and so 
maintain public order … Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulation 
should take must inevitably be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it will depend 
on the specific domestic context.”76 But this does little to ensure that human rights norms 
will protect “religious values” that a state does not value. And, with some notable 
exceptions, the theoretical literature emanating from anti-discrimination scholars has been 
unsympathetic to the dilemmas and inconsistencies this generates, distorted as it sometimes 
is by a lack of sympathy for religious thought in secular scholarship. This has led to a lack 
of theoretical progress, a kind of politico-theoretical deadlock, which has muddled our 
thinking on both anti-discrimination law and religion. 
 
IV. ADDRESSING THE TELEOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN RELIGIOUS ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
It is often said that it is easier to tear down than to build up.  Having, I would like 
to think, deconstructed the Ladele decision, and successfully critiqued significant elements 
of the ECtHR’s religious discrimination jurisprudence, prudence would suggest that I leave 
it at that. But that strategy, although attractive, seems somewhat cowardly, and in this final 
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part, I will suggest that there is an alternative approach which is both workable and 
attractive. We should aim to identify strategies that enable a true dialogue to take place 
over precisely these most contested questions in human rights law, including what to do in 
the Ladele-type situation, with practical implications for how dialogue is conceptualized 
and practiced, by organized religion, the courts, and the academic community. The central 
questions that this Part addresses are what true dialogue involves, and what the courts could 




Bradford Hinze contrasts two approaches to communication: “a dialogic mode …, 
in which messages oscillate between participants, and discursive modes, in which a 
message flows from sender to receiver.”77 In the latter, “[s]peakers are not required to listen 
and listeners are not required to speak. There is no open-ended mutuality, no chance for all 
parties to learn, for participants to be influenced by each other leading to mutual growth.” 
However, Hinze also crucially distinguishes between two different ways in which dialogic 
communication has come to be understood. One mode of dialogue “draws on classical 
Platonic, Augustinian, and personalist theories of dialogue,” and is seen as “able to 
guarantee and safeguard the weight of truth in dialogue.”78 Another mode of dialogue is 
seen “risk[ing] placing the truth of tradition in jeopardy.”79 The former, according to Hinze, 
is a “medium for transmitting and conveying the truth of tradition already established” as 
opposed to the latter that advances “an approach to dialogue [that is] interested not only in 
handing on but also in generating, developing, or revising the truth of the living tradition 
….”80 Hinze does not regard the former as constituting true dialogue, and I am equally 
sceptical. 
 
The problem in engaging in a true dialogue in these terms is not confined to 
religious actors.  We find a degree of fundamentalism on both sides. When both sides claim 
to speak the truth, but “the truths” appear to conflict, the stage is set for a stand-off, which 
may prove difficult to resolve. Lest it be thought that fundamentalism is restricted to 
religious believers, there is also a human rights law tradition that sees human rights as 
advancing a “comprehensive ideology”, as Michael McConnell has called it, in which there 
are “right answers” to be found.81 This approach is the basis for what some have seen as 
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justification for calling human rights the new civil religion. Giorgio Sacerdoti has described 
how, in his view, “[t]he ‘religion’ of human rights and fundamental freedoms has replaced 
other religions and beliefs as the underpinning of social life in contemporary societies.”82 
Unfortunately, the British Parliamentary debates on the same-sex marriage legislation, 
following Ladele, demonstrated this fundamentalist approach to human rights. The position 
of the ECtHR in Ladele, that the question of whether registrars in her position should be 
permitted not to conduct such ceremonies, was an issue for the national authorities to 
consider, was seen, effectively, as giving an imprimatur to those who sought to put claims 
such as hers beyond the pale of acceptable debate. Rather than Ladele being seen as 
encouraging true dialogue, it came to be seen as not requiring any serious dialogue at all. 
 
How should human rights be practiced, if we are to take seriously the idea of a true 
dialogue between secular and religious understandings of human rights? In particular, as 
Michael Ignatieff suggests, how can we best “stop thinking of human rights as trumps and 
begin thinking of them as a language that creates the basis for deliberation”?83 If we aim 
to engage in a genuine dialogue in human rights practice in Ladele-type situations, what 
are the practical implications for the courts’ role? I suggest that taking three concepts more 




We have seen earlier that the ECtHR has viewed the collective aspect of freedom 
of religion as going beyond safeguarding the particular religious community in question, 
considering that “it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been 
dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.”84 For the Court of Human Rights, this 
“pluralism,” we saw, is built “on the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and 
the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, 
literary and socio-economic ideas and concepts”.85 Although adopted in the context of 
freedom of religion, this aspect at least also seems particularly well suited to becoming also 
the appropriate telos of Article 14’s prohibition of religious discrimination, and it would 
not require too significant a shift of perspective to be fit for that purpose. In particular, the 
idea of “diversity” is one that has found a home also in the anti-discrimination context, as 
we have seen. Taken seriously, viewing the telos of religious anti-discrimination law as 
one of “pluralism” in this sense, could have significant effects in reorienting the 
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interpretation of religious anti-discrimination law. Without attempting to be complete, 




The first involves replacing “secularism” with what I’ll call “secularity” as the 
appropriate aim for the relationship between state authority and religion in the public 
sphere. We saw earlier that recent theorizing on the future of religion suggested that 
modernization leads inevitably to secularization, but this is clearly false. Several 
developing countries that have modernized have deepened, rather than ditched, their 
commitments to religious identification (think of Malaysia). Societies in the West have 
seen a growth of religious diversification, where a plethora of new religious groups 
compete with each other and with older established world religions. And religion has 
increasingly been deeply embedded in what has been described as the clash of civilizations. 
Instead of the expulsion of religion from the public space, there has been a resurgence of a 
particular type of religious sensibility, one which seeks, as Jeffrey Haynes puts it, “the 
generalized ‘return’ of religion to the public realm”, what he terms “[r]eligious 
deprivatisation”.86  
 
Theories of secularization were, however, correct in at least one major respect. The 
continuing role of religion in public life does give rise to tensions with key aspects of 
modernity, not least with some aspects of human rights. However, the tensions arising 
between resurgent religion and human rights cannot be considered a transitional issue. On 
the contrary, they are likely to increase and fester if not addressed. Religions are a problem 
for human rights, and human rights are a problem for religions. And both, separately and 
together, are problems for courts. The issue, of course, is what to do about these trends.  
 
There is a critical distinction between two different conceptions of what a secular 
State should aspire to look like. One possibility is what we might call “secularity”, and the 
other is a more comprehensive substantive viewpoint, which we can term “secularism”.87 
Brett Scharffs has explained this distinction in detail elsewhere, 88 but (in summary) 
“secularism” refers to an ideological position that is committed to promoting a secular 
order. Secularism is itself a positive ideology that the State may be committed to 
promoting, an ideology that may manifest itself as opposition to religiously-based or 
religiously-motivated reasoning by political actors, hostility to religion in public life, an 
insistence that religious manifestation should be relegated to an ever-shrinking sphere of 
																																																								
86  Jeffrey Haynes, Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power  (Ashgate, 2012), 1, emphasis 
added.  
87 See BG Scharffs, ‘Four Views of the Citadel: The Consequential Distinction between Secularity 
and Secularism, Religion and Human Rights’ (2011) 6 Religion and Human Rights 109-126. 
88 ibid 110-11. 
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private life, or even an aggressive proselytizing atheism -- what has been called “secular 
fundamentalism.”89 
 
By contrast, “secularity” means an approach to religion-State relations that avoids 
identification of the State with any particular religion or ideology (including secularism 
itself) and endeavors to provide a framework capable of accommodating a broad range of 
religions and ideological beliefs. Secularity is a more modest concept, committed to 
creating what might be called a broad realm of “constitutional and legal space” in which 
competing conceptions of the good (some religious, some not) may be worked out in theory 
and lived in practice by their proponents, adherents, and critics. Those committed to 
secularity consider it to be preferable to secularism as a guide to the right relationship 
between religion and the State because we should be sceptical of utopian visions, and 
distrust those who seek to compel the implementation of an all-embracing vision of the 
good or right.   
 
Secularism, in other words, should not become the State religion – explicitly or 
implicitly. The State should not attempt to promote a pristine secular order where the public 
realm is scrubbed clean of all religious residue. This is not only a dystopian vision of 
neutrality, which is often defined in terms of what is excluded rather than by what is 
included, it is not really “neutrality” at all, at least in any satisfying sense of the term. The 
reason secularity is a more attractive ideal is because it is not an ideology, but rather a 
framework for pluralism. If it is a conception of the good, it is a thin one. It does not say 
there is no “truth”, but rather that it is not the State’s job either to identify and promote a 
particular comprehensive truth, or to oppose it. “Secularity”, in my view, better describes 
the current theory of the ECtHR than does “secularism”, however imperfectly it puts that 




More practically still, how can human rights courts begin to develop techniques to 
help stimulate a genuine dialogue that encourages secularity and furthers a pluralistic 
vision of the public space? Let’s return to the ECtHR’s decision in Ladele. The Court, in 
my view, was misguided in not developing the tool of proportionality in such a way as to 
enable it to deal with these claims.  In this respect, the German, Canadian and South African 
courts provide a considerably better model of how to address these difficult cases, not least 
because they have identified human dignity as underpinning the claims of both those who 
are seeking to restrict religious practices, and those who are seeking to manifest their 
religious beliefs. As Sachs J said in Christian Education South Africa, “The right to believe 
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or not to believe, and to act or not to act according to his or her beliefs or non-beliefs, is 
one of the key ingredients of any person’s dignity. (…) [R]eligious belief has the capacity 
to awake concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human 
rights.”90 This use of “dignity” thus enables a degree of commensurability to be identified 
between the values to be balanced in situations where there is an apparent clash of the rights 
protected. The solution adopted should be that which is most compatible with advancing 
“human dignity”. Neither side of the debate is ruled out of court, there are no “outlaws”, 
and respectful attention is given to the claims of both parties. 
 
The Canadian and South African courts approach the interpretation of rights and 
interests in ways that that attempt to create the maximum space for rights by, seemly 
paradoxically, requiring both sides in the dispute not to push their rights or interests to the 
limit. This way of thinking about the role of rights in true dialogue has been taken up, for 
example, by Judge Albie Sachs in the South African Constitutional Court, when he sought 
to inject aspects of mediation into resolving rights disputes involving the ejection of 
squatters, because it was vital for all those involved in the dispute to recognize that they 
were involved in a community with each other.91 It is akin, also, to what the German 
Constitutional Court has termed the principle of “practical concordance”. “This conflict 
among various bearers of a fundamental right guaranteed without reservation, and between 
that fundamental right and other constitutionally protected objects,” the Court held in the 
famous Classroom Crucifix case, “is to be resolved on the principle of practical 
concordance, which requires that no one of the conflicting legal positions be preferred and 
maximally asserted, but all given as protective as possible an arrangement.”92 Both rights, 
or in the case of disputes within the anti-discrimination principle itself, both aspects of 
equality, carry significant weight.  They should therefore both be protected to the greatest 
extent possible, and this requires that each be accommodated to the greatest extent possible 
by the other.  Only by each side “backing off” from making claims that assert its interests 
to the limit, can this be accomplished.  
 
V. THE LADELE SITUATION REVISITED 
 
What difference would an approach based on pluralism, secularity and 
accommodation make to the way in which the Ladele situation would be adjudicated? 
Several judgments in which this approach plays a central role illustrate how this could work 
																																																								
90 At [36]. 
91 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC), Sachs J, at [39]: 
‘… one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the different 
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in practice, and is suitable for adoption in the context of anti-discrimination law. In 
Multani, for example, the Canadian Supreme Court struck down the order of a Quebec 
school authority that had prohibited a Sikh child from wearing a kirpan to school; the Court 
considered that the “minimal impairment” element of proportionality required the state to 
satisfy the court on the basis of evidence that a reasonable accommodation of the religious 
practice could not be achieved.93 In Christian Education South Africa, 94 Sachs J (giving 
the judgment of the Court) stated:  
 
“The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious and religious freedom has to 
be regarded with appropriate seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must 
go in allowing members of religious communities to define for themselves which 
laws they will obey and which not.  Such a society can cohere only if all its 
participants accept that certain basic norms and standards are binding.  
Accordingly, believers cannot claim an automatic right to be exempted by their 
beliefs from the laws of the land.  At the same time, the state should, wherever 
reasonably possible, seek to avoid putting believers to extremely painful and 
intensely burdensome choices of either being true to their faith or else respectful of 
the law.”95 
 
Significantly, it was this approach that led Justice Sachs, in Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fourie,96 the South African Constitutional Court’s decision upholding a claim 
that the Constitution obliged the state to provide a means of recognizing same-sex unions, 
to require that state registrars who objected on religious grounds should be permitted not 
to be involved in granting such recognition. Justice Sachs, giving the judgment of the 
Court, stated: “The principle of reasonable accommodation could97 be applied by the state 
to ensure that civil marriage officers who had sincere religious objections to officiating at 
same-sex marriages would not themselves be obliged to do so if this resulted in a violation 
of their conscience.”  
 
In Ladele-type situations, such an approach seems particularly apposite, where the 
tension is between the right to non-discrimination on grounds of religion and the right to 
non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, and there is no principled basis for 
deciding which should have priority. There was no indication in the national Court’s 
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95 At [35]. 
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decision, nor in the ECtHR, why one is less worthy of the strongest protection than the 
other. Indeed, the local authority’s own policy, Dignity for All, under which the domestic 
court considered that the local authority was acting, protected employees from both 
religious discrimination and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, without 
ranking them in importance.  
 
The appropriate solution would have been for the national authorities to consider 
whether Ms Ladele’s conscientious objection could be reasonably accommodated, along 
the lines suggested by Justice Sachs.  It might be argued that asking the Court to require 
the local authority to reasonably accommodate Ms Ladele involves it examining whether 
a domestic authority’s refusal to grant an exemption or exception from a general policy for 
religious reasons is compatible with the Convention, and that this is a matter that falls 
within the margin of appreciation. But this way of framing the reasonable accommodation 
claim is seriously misleading. To view the failure to accommodate as the creation of an 
exemption distorts a long jurisprudence on discrimination in which reasonable 
accommodation is seen, rather, as a way of avoiding unlawful discrimination, rather than 
as creating an “exception or exemption”. Viewing reasonable accommodation as creating 
privileges for one group appears to demonstrate a misunderstanding of this long anti-
discrimination jurisprudence,98 or a desire to see the religious discrimination claim as really 
a freedom of religion claim (where the language of special exemption is prevalent).  
 
Applying an anti-discrimination approach, properly understood, the Court could 
have sought to preserve to the maximum extent possible both the right to sexual orientation 
equality and the right to religious equality, where they are or may be in conflict. And had 
this approach been adopted, the Ladele case itself might have seemed a relatively easy one, 
because in that case, there was in fact no conflict between the rights of Ms Ladele and those 
of actual same sex couples seeking civil partnerships. As we have seen, her conscientious 
objection could have been accommodated without any adverse effects on actual same sex 
couples. Ms Ladele was disciplined not to protect any actual same sex couple (whose rights 
were not, therefore, impeded in practice) but to use the disciplining of a public servant to 
“send a message” to the wider community. In such a situation, the court ought to have held 
that there could be no proportionate justification for refusing to accommodate her 
conscientious objection. And the subsequent debate in Parliament might even have been 
more of a true dialogue, and less a dialogue of the deaf. 
 
																																																								
98 We did not say after Brown v Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) that the United States 
Supreme Court had created a special exemption for African American children from the legal requirement to 
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